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Introduction 
East Asia's vaunted newly industrialising countries 
(NICs) are in trouble. 
In 1990, Taiwan registered its lowest annual rise in GNP 
since 1982, while Korea was hit with a $21 billion 
deficit on its current account after five years of surplus. 
While stocks plunged in both Taipei and Seoul, real 
estate prices sky-rocketed. Labow ... ~•ganising continues 
on a militant course in both countries, and citizens' 
movements have emerged to protest worsening income 
distribution, the erosion of agriculture, and the 
deterioration of the environment 
It is tempting to dismiss these developments as 
conjunctural crises or as transitional troubles on the way 
to developed country status, as many orthodox 
economists do. Upon closer analysis, however, these 
difficulties appear to stem from something more 
fundamental: the unravelling of the economic strategy 
that delivered impressive growth rates for more than two 
decades. 
The current crisis of the NIC strategy of export-oriented, 
high-speed growth springs from the dangerous 
interst>ction of three trends: 
The deterioration of the external trading 
environment due to rising protectionism; 
The loss of export competetiveness owing to 
the NICs' continuing dependence on labour-
intensive production after losing their edge in 
cheap labour; 
And the eruption of the long-suppressed 
environmental, agricultural and political costs 
exacted by this pattern of growth. 
The Impact of protectionism 
The overriding dilemma of the so-called 'tiger' 
economies is that they continue to be heavily structured 
as export machines at a time when protectionism spreads 
in their main market. the US, and prevents them from 
enlarging their minuscule shares of the European and 
Japanese markets. In the scramble for substitute 
markets, the Koreans talk excitedly about the 'opening to 
the East' But this is likely to be an illusion, since 
market-oriented austerity measures in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union have significantly depressed 
purchasing power, thus eliminating these countries as 
significant mass markets, at least in the short and 
medium term. 
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Protectionism is not the only obstacle in the way of the 
NICs' pursuit of markets. Even if trade barriers had not 
risen in western markets and the NICs' currencies had 
not been forced to appreciate, their export 
competitiveness would still be eroded by their 
continuing addiction to labour-intensive production at a 
time that they have been priced out of the cheap labour 
market 
Pushed up by the rising cost of living, the drying up of 
rural labour reserves and effective labour organising, the 
average wage in Taiwan and Korea now stands at 
roughly three times that in Southeast Asia and ten times 
that in China. Not surprisingly, many Korean and 
Taiwanese manufacturers dependent on cheap labour for 
their export edge have followed the example of US and 
Japanese investors and relocated their operations to 
Southeast Asia and China. 
The loss of the cheap labour advantage had, in fact, been 
anticipated by Korean and Taiwanese technocrats in the 
mid-eighties. They therefore advanced an offensive 
strategy of going 'high tech' - that is, shifting to more 
skill and technology-intensive production of higher 
value-added commodities like computers, microchips, 
optical disc drives, and videodisc players. This meant 
taking on the US and Japan directly. 
Rhetoric, however, was not backed with hard cash. 
Taiwanese and Korean firms preferred to park their 
profits in real estate and the stock market rather than 
invest in risky research and development projects. 
Government spending in research and development 
remained pitifully low compared to levels in the US and 
Japan. Efforts to upgrade the educational system to 
produce more technical personnel were woefully 
inadequate, even as the brain drain to the US continued 
unabated. With only 32 engineers per 10,000 people, 
Korea is ill-positioned to compete with Japan, where the 
ratio is 240 per 10,000. 
As a result. low-tech production continues to be the rule. 
Taiwan's famous 'computer industry' is actually a 
glorified description of the low-tech, labour-intensive 
mass cloning of easy-to-copy IBM models. Likewise, 
Korea remains, for the most part, a labour-intensive 
assembly point for high-tech Japanese components. 
Korea's image of being a high-tech producer is belied by 
a few sobering realities: the best-selling Hyundai Excel 
may be Korea's best know export, but its body styling is 
Italian in origin, its engine is designed by Mitsubishi, 
and its transmission is both designed and manufactured 
by Mitsubishi. Korean colour television sets may be 
competing toe to toe with Japanese products, but 
Japanese components account for 85 per cent of their 
value. Korea may be the world's fifth largest exporter of 
personal computers, but only the computer cabinet, 
claims the country's leading electronics journal, is 
actually made in the country. 
These examples help explain why Korea's trade deficit 
with Japan is soaring, even as its trade surplus with the 
US declines. Unless there is a fundamental shift in 
economic strategy, the unenviable future that awaits 
Korea and Taiwan's 'high tech' producers is one in which 
high-cost Japanese components are assembled by high-
cost but low-skilled Taiwanese and Korean labour with 
high-cost, licensed Japanese technology. 
Agricultural and environmental implications 
At the same time that protectionism and the inability to 
shake off the addiction to labour-intensive production 
have eroded their export competitiveness, Taiwan and 
Korea have been overtaken by the explosion of the long-
suppressed internal costs exacted by the NIC strategy. 
Nearly three decades of policies and incentives 
favouring export industry over agriculture have 
produced a deep crisis in the countryside, the main 
elements of which are rural incomes which are low 
relative to urban incomes, a depopulated countryside, an 
aging work force and low labour productivity. Now, an 
aggressive US trade offensive threatens to eliminated the 
protectionist mechanisms that stand between the survival 
of vital sectors of agriculture and their extinction. 
Beleaguered farmers have finally been roused into 
militant opposition to prevailing export-industry-biased 
economic policies by their belief that the destructive 
dumping of US agricultural surpluses is the quid pro quo 
for the continued access of Taiwanese and Korean 
manufactured exports to the US. 
The environment, like agriculture, has absorbed the high 
costs of high-speed industrialisation. In both Taiwan 
and Korea, pollution controls were opposed by 
technocrats who viewed them as adding costs that would 
cut into export competitiveness. The result was a lethal 
combination of high-speed industrialisation and 
extremely lax or nonexistent environmental regulation 
that produced horror stories rivalling those from Eastern 
Europe, like the fact that much of Korea's tap water is 
unsafe to drink and a third of Taiwan's rice crop is 
unsafe to eat because of heavy metal content that far 
exceeds official tolerance levels. 
indeed, severe environmental degradation is beginning 
to boomerang on the export economy itself, threatening 
its productive capacity. In Taiwan, for instance, the 
outflow of toxic chemical wastes from upstream 
industries regularly results in the mass deaths of 
shrimps, fish and oysters produced by Taiwan's 
downstream aquaculture industry, one of the island's 
major foreign exchange earners. 
The environmental devastation of Taiwan has produced 
one of Asia's most effective environmental movements -
one that has succeeded in delaying, if not stopping, the 
construction of more petrochemical and nuclear plants, 
which technocrats see as necessary to sustain export-
oriented growth. More alarming to the Kuomintang 
authorities is the spread of anti-growth consciousness 
among the citizenry: 60 per cent of Taiwanese, a 1985 
survey discovered, prefer environmental protection to 
economic growth. 
Political implications 
Finally, continued pursuit of the NIC strategy is proving 
to be politically very costly. For the strategy of export-
oriented, cheap-labour dependent development may have 
delivered prosperity, but it has not secured popular 
legitimacy. This is a direct result of a historical choice 
made early on by the state and business elites: to 
implement the NIC strategy, they opted to secure the 
compliance of labour via the shortcut of repression 
rather than through more complex democratic 
mechanisms. The tremendous pressure that built up over 
two decades of tight authoritarian control fmally forced 
political decompression in Korea and Taiwan in 1987. 
And when the new democratic politics arrived, it 
focused not on forging consensus on the strategy for 
economic growth, but on a polarised struggle over the 
benefits of past growth. 
Militancy, not moderation, is the mainstream in Korean 
labour politics, a mood that was expressed by Lee So-
Sun, one of the most revered figures in the labour 
movement. Asked if labour's wage demands were not 
posing a problem for Korea's export competitiveness, 
she replied: 'The government says the economy is 
successful. But only a few benefit from the 
economy ... There is nothing in it for us.' Such militant 
class consciousness hardly lends itself to 
institutionalising western-style collective bargaining 
processes or forging a labour-management consensus on 
a new economic strategy. 
With the benefit of hindsight, some Taiwanese and 
Korean technocrats are absorbing the bitter lesson that 
authoritarianism may deliver stunning growth rates in 
the short and medium term, but it ultimately chokes 
economic development. 
Conclusions 
In sum, it is undeniable that the NIC strategy of export-
oriented growth delivered high-speed growth over the 
last 25 years. However, a lethal conjunction of 
international and internal developments is leading to the 
unravelling of the NIC model, leaving ailing tigers 
stranded on the perilous zone between the developed and 
underdeveloped worlds. It will take a new, bold set of 
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economic policies to keep them from sliding back to the 
Third World in the 1990's. 
The elements of an alternative strategy are increasingly 
evident. These include emphasising income 
redistribution to expand the domestic market; forging a 
New Deal for agriculture; encouraging enterprises that 
combine profitability with ecological sustainability; 
establishing preferential trading and technological 
arrangements with Southeast Asia and Indo-china as a 
counterweight to both western protectionism and 
Japanese economic power; significantly stepping up 
research and development efforts and upgrading 
technical education; devising a targeted, as opposed to 
an indiscriminate, export policy that would allow the 
development of a frrm' industrial and technological base 
for selected manufactured exports. And, most important, 
institutionalising democratic decision-making at the very 
centre of economic policy-making. 
The contours of the.;altemative economic agenda are 
discernible. Less obvious is the political will to break 
with the past policies. Indeed, it seems unlikely the 
currently dominant economic and political interests that 
devised and directedlhe implementation of the old NIC 
strategy will allow this necessary process of economic 
renovation to take place without resistance. 
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